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WHITHER FARM POLICY? 
 
As the U.S. Congress prepares to pump at 
least $8.7 billion in supplemental aid to 
farmers (on top of the $10.5 billion that has 
already been earmarked), many people—
both in and out of agriculture—are openly 
wondering if there isn’t a better way to run 
farm programs.  To many, it seems that we 
have no coherent farm policy in the sense 
that tax dollars are being committed with a 
clear objective in mind.  After two straight 
years of supplemental appropriations, it is 
clear that the current farm program (the 
FAIR Act of 1996, commonly known as 
Freedom to Farm) is not a politically 
sustainable policy.  And, the policy 
objective of the ad-hoc aid is clouded by the 
apparent inability of Congress to pass aid 
packages targeting assistance to the most at-
risk farmers.  
In fact, because federal price support 
payments depend on harvested production, 
the largest amount of aid will go to crop 
producers who harvest the biggest yields. 
Thus, Iowa corn farmers who expect bumper 
crops this fall will receive higher federal 
payments than will drought-stricken corn 
farmers in the eastern United States. (It 
should be noted that the farmers affected by 
the drought will receive crop insurance 
indemnities—if they had the foresight to 
purchase crop insurance—in addition to 
some emergency drought aid.)  Furthermore, 
the group suffering more financial stress 
than any other—hog producers—will be 
receiving little federal assistance. 
Many critics are calling for an end to 
Freedom to Farm.  Some see solutions in  
 
further reform of the crop insurance 
program, while others are calling for 
adoption of a new policy made up of 
remnants of the former farm bills.  But, 
before any new reform proposal can be 
seriously evaluated, we need to ask—and 
answer—“What do we want farm policy to 
accomplish?”  
 
Farm Program Proposals:  
A Crowded Menu 
It is naive to think that achieving agreement 
on farm policy objectives will be an easy 
task, especially when we consider the 
crowded menu of interest-group proposals. 
• Environmental groups want farm 
payments to be used to entice farmers 
to adopt environmentally-friendly 
production practices. 
• Many rural advocacy groups want farm 
program payments targeted to small 
producers, believing that many small 
farmers increase rural vitality more than 
fewer large ones. 
• Input suppliers prefer payment schemes 
that do not require a reduction in 
planted acreage. 
• Non-farming landlords prefer payment 
schemes that are predictable so that 
land values and cash rents will be 
enhanced. 
• Farm operators who rent land should 
prefer payments that do not get 
automatically bid into land rental rates.  
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• Livestock producers—a group that has 
never been eligible for federal aid—
simply hope that federal policy does not 
increase the price they must pay for 
their feed. 
• Processors and exporters prefer a policy 
that encourages expanded production. 
• True believers in the free market point 
out that the producer price floors in the 
FAIR Act (the loan rates) limit 
agriculture’s flexibility.  Land that 
should go out of production in response 
to low market prices stays in production 
because the government-guaranteed 
price is higher than the market price. 
• Some point to the government’s 
responsibility to maintain national food 
security and an affordable food supply 
as reasons to subsidize crop production.  
• And Congress, it seems, just wants to 
be viewed as doing something for 
agriculture.  
The wide reach and diversity of these 
collective policy preferences (the list is not 
exhaustive) indicate that we need to step 
back, gain a more unified perspective, and 
then discuss what the role of government in 
agriculture should be, and why. 
 
Correcting Market Failures   
The first, and perhaps most frequently cited, 
reason for government intervention is to 
correct market failures.  Economists deem a 
market to have failed when the price 
consumers pay for a product is significantly 
different from the cost of production.  
Agriculture faces two potential market 
failures: (1) agricultural pollution, and (2) 
the exercise of excess market concentration 
in input supply and output processing. 
Free-market prices generally do not account 
for the cost of pollution because pollution 
damages are not borne by producers of 
goods and services. Thus, agricultural prices 
will understate the full cost of production 
when agricultural production leads to 
substantial pollution.  Steps can be taken to 
make sure that the cost of cleaning up 
pollution is fully reflected in the price of the 
good.  Such intervention can actually 
increase the benefits of a free market 
economy by ensuring that all costs of 
production are reflected in market prices. 
The use of market power by large firms to 
enhance their profits can result in a 
divergence of price from production costs 
also.  The agribusiness sector has come 
under fire recently for allegedly 
manipulating input and output prices to the 
detriment of farmers.  To date, however, 
convincing evidence of excess market power 
exists only in specific cases, such as the one 
brought by the U.S. government against the 
Archer Daniels Midland Company for fixing 
the price of lysine.  Scant evidence exists for 
concluding that farmers have been the 
victims of price fixing by large agribusiness 
firms, although the potential grows as 
concentration grows. 
Enhancing Farmers’  
Management Decisions  
A second argument for government 
intervention is that farmers need support 
because they face tremendous variability in 
output prices.  Market prices for raw 
agricultural commodities are quite sensitive 
to quantities produced, so that in years of 
bumper crops, market prices can be quite 
low, and in years of short crops, market 
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prices are significantly higher. Government 
programs could stabilize prices by 
subsidizing commodity storage, or by 
placing a floor below which prices cannot 
fall.  A more modern version of this 
reasoning is that farm incomes are highly 
variable from year to year because of a 
reliance on unpredictable export demand, 
and therefore government intervention is 
needed to stabilize income. 
While it may be true that farmers face 
variability in yields, prices, and income, 
variability does not, by itself, constitute a 
market failure.  Variability is simply a 
characteristic of agricultural markets.  
Farmers can take action to manage income 
variability, including diversifying crops 
(oats, alfalfa, vegetables, trees), 
incorporating livestock enterprises, and 
purchasing insurance.   
It must be remembered that many U.S. 
farmers are able to manage variability and 
thrive with no federal subsidies. Producers 
of livestock, fresh produce, tree crops, and 
nursery crops do not receive government 
support. The markets they compete in are no 
less variable than markets for cotton, the 
major food and feed grains, or milk.  The 
question of why producers of these latter 
crops need federal help in managing 
variability while other producers do not 
needs to be answered before variability can 
be used to justify intervention. 
Interest-Group Pressure 
A third reason for government intervention 
is simply that the government is responding 
to pressure from producer interest groups.  
There is nothing unique about interest 
groups lobbying for passage of legislation 
favorable to their constituents.  In fact, that 
is the way that democracies function.  One 
policy option is accept this reality and 
design farm policy to transfer enough money 
to agriculture to satisfy political pressure, 
but do it in a way that minimizes the long-
run damage to the agricultural sector.  
Why the FAIR Act?  
Most observers believe that the FAIR Act 
was passed because of a unique combination 
of history and circumstances.  In the mid-
1990s, the national political climate and 
robust economic conditions turned the tide 
away from traditional farm policies that had 
government both supporting prices and 
limiting production. 
• In 1995, the Republican Party took 
control of the House of Representatives 
and vowed to greatly decrease 
government’s role in the economy to 
fulfill its “Contract with America.” 
Some in the Party targeted farm 
programs from day one because they 
were seen as a prime example of 
government interference with free 
markets and the management of farm 
operations.   
• Then, in the fall and winter of 1995, 
crop prices increased to levels such that 
traditional farm program payments 
would essentially disappear.  
• Meanwhile, in Congress, Senator 
Lugar, Chair of the Agricultural, 
Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, and 
others saw the need to continue down 
the path of incremental reform of farm 
programs toward greater market 
orientation and lower government costs 
that had been initiated with the previous 
farm bills.  
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• Responding to the strength in 
commodity prices, mainstream 
producer groups rallied behind 
Freedom to Farm with its fixed 
program payments, and it passed. 
Given this history, it is not surprising that 
many former advocates of FAIR are calling 
for a return to the old farm policy now that 
crop prices have fallen to levels where 
payments would be higher under the former 
supply-control programs. 
But wouldn’t an abandonment of Freedom 
to Farm reduce the flexibility and 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector?  
After all, many advocates of the current 
policy say that by getting government out of 
agriculture, Freedom to Farm has forced 
farmers to look to the marketplace for 
signals about what and how much to 
produce, rather than to government. But this 
is far from an accurate assessment.    
Acreage was planted in 1999 solely because 
the government floor prices were in place. 
Thus, the large supply of crops in 1999 and 
the resulting low market prices were actually 
enhanced by the FAIR Act’s floor prices. 
The supply expansion was especially 
significant for soybeans because the 
government floor price of soybeans was set 
high relative to the floor prices of corn and 
wheat in the FAIR Act. 
In addition, the 1999 increase in crop 
insurance subsidies also increased 
production.  There is an old adage that you 
always get more of what you subsidize.  
Thus crop insurance subsidies tend to 
increase risky behavior.  The subsidies 
increase the viability of continuous wheat 
production in the arid Great Plains on land 
more suitable for wheat grown in a wheat-
fallow rotation. The subsidies also increase 
the production of corn and soybeans on land 
that is more suited for crops that can better 
withstand drought and high heat. 
A Flexible and Competitive 
Agricultural Sector 
There are few people, if any, who believe 
that the current farm policy should be 
maintained; and at times the clamor for a 
new farm policy has been deafening. The 
loudest voices are saying that the U.S. 
government should dramatically increase its 
involvement in agriculture. Given that the 
role of government in agriculture in 1999 is 
already pervasive, these fervent appeals 
bring us back to our original question: What 
exactly do we want farm policy to do? 
If we want policy to move midwestern 
agriculture to a market-oriented system, with 
farmers producing the commodities 
consumers want, in the quantities that can be 
profitably produced, then we should 
eliminate all government-guaranteed prices 
(the loan rates) and crop insurance subsidies.  
Under this policy alternative, land in low-
yielding fringe production areas would come 
out of production in 2000, the supply of 
crops would drop, and the prices of corn, 
soybeans, and wheat would increase.  The 
low-cost producers would be able to weather 
this disruption in supply and would come 
out of it in better shape than if the current 
policy is maintained. This policy objective, 
however, appears to be a “non-starter,” 
because the vast majority of opinion leaders 
and farm organizations are opposed to a 
letting the market determine who should be 
producing crops in the Midwest. 
If we want farm policy to supplement 
farmers’ incomes in a way that maintains the 
long-run benefits of production flexibility 
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and a market-driven agricultural sector, then 
we should eliminate the loan rates and crop 
insurance subsidies, and simply write 
government checks to farmers.  The size of 
the checks should have no relationship to the 
actual production decisions that farmers 
implement. If Congress needs to transfer 
more money to agriculture when widespread 
crop or revenue loss occurs, the size of the 
checks could depend inversely on the level 
of market prices or revenue levels in a 
region (state or county).  
At the county level, such programs already 
exist.  For example, the Group Risk Plan 
(GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection 
(GRIP) pay farmers indemnities if county 
average yield or county average revenue is 
below a certain level.  Because the payments 
depend on county yield, a single farmer’s 
actions cannot affect the level of payment.  
The government could give every farmer a 
GRP or GRIP policy. If farmers want to add 
individualized risk management protection, 
then they could pay the full cost of business-
interruption insurance plan, much like other 
businesses do. 
The key factor in a flexible and competitive 
agricultural sector is that farm-level 
production decisions need to be reflected in 
farm income.  Only then will we see 
midwestern farmers producing the crops that 
consumers want, at prices that cover the cost 
of production. 
Clearly, the debate about what to do about 
farm policy is very much alive.  But what 
we need to focus on is the ultimate objective 
of farm policy and the costs of 
implementing policies to meet this objective.  
We should build on what we have learned 
from our experience with the old supply-
control programs, the various environmental 
provisions, and with Freedom to Farm to 
design a policy that does not hinder 
agriculture’s ability to respond to current 
and future economic realities.  
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